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I. Introduction
 In the United States, many important land use decisions are 
made, at least in the fi rst instance, by local administrative bodies com-
posed of citizens appointed by the mayor or city council. Although the 
names and responsibilities of these groups vary somewhat, they are tra-
ditionally designated the Planning and Zoning (P&Z) commission and 
the Board of Zoning Adjustment or Zoning Appeals (BZA). Under the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, 1 used as the model for the major-
ity of state zoning systems, 2 the P&Z commission formulates the city’s 
comprehensive plan, which serves to guide future land use planning, 
and recommends to the city council specifi c zoning classifi cations for 
each district and amendments thereto. 3 The BZA, on the other hand, 
makes decisions on variances and special use permits, providing the 
system with necessary fl exibility. 4 This article will refer to these two 
bodies collectively as “zoning boards.” 
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 1.  Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1926),  available at http://myapa.
planning. org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf [hereinafter “SSZEA”]. 
 2. Ruth Knack, Stuart Meck, & Israel Stollman,  The Real Story Behind the Standard 
Planning and Zoning Acts of the 1920s ,  Land Use L. & Zoning Dig. 3, 8 (Feb. 1996) 
(citing Department of Commerce study noting that 35 states adopted legislation mod-
eled after SSZEA). 
 3.  Douglas W. Kmiec, Zoning and Planning Deskbook § 4:3 (2d ed. 2007). 
 4. SSZEA, supra note 1 § 7 (enumerating BZA functions);  Kmiec ,  supra note 3 
§ 4:15. 
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 In some instances, the zoning board makes the fi nal decision on such 
important matters as special use permits or variances. In other instances, 
such as zoning amendments, the board’s decision is merely advisory 
and must be approved by the city council. Even in those cases, however, 
the board’s recommendation typically wields signifi cant infl uence and 
authority. As discussed in Section II, courts accord zoning board deci-
sions (and city council decisions based on zoning board recommenda-
tions) a presumption of validity and employ a deferential standard of 
review. The deference accorded to zoning board decisions, however, is 
based in large part on the premise that they are neutral administrative 
bodies. Unfortunately, that may not be the case. 
 In fact, many sense that zoning boards often make land use decisions 
based on extra-legal factors, undermining their legitimacy. 5 The signifi -
cance of the property interests at stake in these decisions heightens the 
potential for corruption, favoritism, and bias. 6 Confl ict of interest provi-
sions, even where they exist, typically do little to address generalized or 
systemic bias problems. 7 Instead, the best way to reduce the potential for 
bias may lie in the appointment process: selecting a broad cross- section 
of disinterested citizens to zoning boards should ensure both that deci-
sions are fair and that they are perceived by the public to be so. 
 Even in the formative years of comprehensive planning, scholars 
recognized that, because zoning boards wielded such power, it was im-
portant to ensure that they fairly represented the community. In 1937, 
Dr. Robert Walker conducted a survey of thirty-one of the largest cities in 
the country, to determine the occupations of their planning commission 
members. 8 The results disturbed him: about 80% of commission mem-
bers were drawn from what he called the “professional and technical” 
class, including business owners, lawyers, architects, engineers, and re-
altors. 9 Of course, he recognized legitimate reasons for the prevalence of 
certain occupations. 10 Commissions tended to include lawyers, for exam-
  5. Mark W. Cordes,  Policing Bias and Confl icts of Interest in Zoning Decision-
making , 65 N.D. L. Rev. 161, 162 (1989) (describing ad hoc, “dealmaking” nature of 
zoning decisions). 
  6.  See, e.g. , Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 257-58 (1992) (discussing brib-
ery in a zoning matter); s ee generally Robert C. Ellickson & Vicki L. Been,  Land Use 
Control , at 341-49 (2d ed. 2000) (detailing proof and perceptions of “dealmaking” 
and corruption in zoning). 
  7. Cordes, supra note 5, at 174-89 (concluding that confl ict of interest rules ap-
plicable to zoning are insuffi cient); Jerry L. Anderson & Erin Sass,  Is the Wheel Unbal-
anced? A Study of Bias on Zoning Boards , 36  Urb. Law . 447, 450-52 (2004) (same). 
  8.  Robert A. Walker, The Planning Function In Urban Government 150 
(Univ. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1950). 
  9.  Id . at 151. 
 10.  Id. 
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ple, because numerous legal issues arose in commission activities. They 
included business owners because economic development was a central 
purpose of planning and, especially in the early days of comprehensive 
land use control, the commission needed to ensure its decisions would be 
accepted by civic leaders. 11 Architects, planners, and builders provided 
the necessary expertise concerning planning options and the potential 
effects or feasibility of various restrictions. 12 Nevertheless, Walker was 
concerned that the resulting commission membership failed to represent 
a cross-section of the community, and that blue-collar interests, in partic-
ular, were almost entirely excluded from the decision- making process. 13 
Moreover, Walker believed that business and professional members 
would be more likely to favor expansion and development, neglecting 
the point of view of what he called “the ordinary citizen,” who did not 
stand to benefi t directly from development activity. 14 
 For this article, we replicated Walker’s study, to determine whether 
seventy years later, zoning boards in the United States continue to be 
populated primarily by white-collar members, especially those tied to de-
velopment and business interests. The study is more comprehensive than 
Walker’s; we gathered data on the occupational composition of both the 
P&Z commission and the BZA for 137 of the nation’s largest cities. In 
total, we analyzed the occupations of 442 BZA members and 982 P&Z 
commission members. The results, discussed in Section III below, con-
fi rm that these boards have not changed much from Walker’s 1937 study: 
board members continue to be drawn overwhelmingly from white-collar 
occupations and thus fail to represent a real cross-section of the commu-
nity. In addition, zoning boards continue to be dominated by a few types 
of occupations: business owners, developers, attorneys and politicians. 
Thus, the “ordinary citizen” described by Walker is still not represented. 
 Of course, the suggestion that zoning boards are heavily populated 
with interest group representatives is an old idea and hardly surpris-
ing. 15 Historically, the design of zoning boards populated by “experts” 
sprang from Progressives’ faith in professionals and contempt for ordi-
nary politics. 16 City offi cials may believe that the technical nature of the 
boards’ functions requires expertise these professionals can provide. 
The political nature of the zoning boards’ function may inevitably lead 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Walker ,  supra note 8, at 153. 
 14.  Id . at 151-52. 
 15.  See, e.g. ,  Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game,  passim (1966). 
 16. Terence Ball,  The Authority of Experts , 13  Contemp. Soc. 743, 744 (Nov. 1984) 
(book review). 
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to the involvement of those with vested interests in the process. 17 In-
deed, one view suggests that achieving a rough balance between interest 
groups may be preferable to attempting to fi nd elusive and perhaps il-
lusory “ordinary citizens,” who frankly may be less motivated to under-
take the tedious work of these panels. 
 These results, however, raise the question of whether the occupa-
tional skew makes a real difference in the planning and zoning decision-
making process. If cities could achieve a more representative board 
composition, how would planning and zoning decisions be affected? 
In order to address that question, we conducted a survey of citizens 
to solicit their opinions on various controversial land use issues. By 
categorizing the results according to the respondent’s occupation and 
other demographic characteristics, we sought to determine whether the 
views of the “ordinary citizen,” as Walker put it, differ from the views 
of the typical representative of the professional, managerial, and tech-
nical class. We also explored how other demographic factors, such as 
race, age, income or educational level, correlate with zoning attitudes. 
In Section IV below, we discuss the results of this survey of public at-
titudes toward zoning issues. 
 Ultimately, the results of these studies lead us to recommend that 
those who appoint members to zoning boards strive to include a broad 
cross-section of citizens to ensure that all views are presented. We 
are cognizant that certain natural tendencies lead to the appointment 
of white-collar board members and we recognize that those members 
provide valuable, even indispensible, functions on these boards. Nev-
ertheless, the changing role of zoning boards, combined with the avail-
ability of professional planning staff and legal counsel now may allow 
for a broader group of citizens to be included. In the end, we anticipate 
that more representative boards will lead to better decision-making 
and greater community acceptance of board decisions. Unless zoning 
boards begin to at least approximate the ideal of a neutral administra-
tive body, courts may need to re-think the deference they typically grant 
to board decisions. 
 II. Zoning Boards in the United States 
 State zoning systems today come in many varieties, making generaliza-
tions diffi cult. The basic structure in most states, however, is based on 
 17.  See  Don T. Allensworth, The Political Realities of Urban Planning 
79-80 (1975) (stating that interest groups are heavily represented on zoning boards). 
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two uniform acts drafted by committees appointed by the federal gov-
ernment in the 1920s. The State City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA), 
published in 1928, gave states model legislation to authorize municipal 
land use planning, including the adoption of a comprehensive plan. 18 
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) of 1924, drafted by 
the Advisory Committee on Zoning appointed by U.S. Commerce Sec-
retary Herbert Hoover, became the model for the zoning system in use 
in most states. 19 
 Section 6 of the SSZEA provided that the initial zoning ordinance, 
including the location of the various districts, should be drafted by a 
commission made up of “an outside body of representative citizens.” 20 
Similarly, the SCPEA provided for an independent citizen board, called 
a planning commission, which would be responsible for formulating 
and revising the jurisdiction’s comprehensive plan. 21 In most states, 
these planning and zoning duties now have been combined in one P&Z 
commission. 22 While the SSZEA contemplated that the zoning commis-
sion would be temporary, 23 today the P&Z commission is a permanent 
fi xture typically responsible for approving subdivision plats and site 
plans and recommending zoning amendments. 24 
 Most jurisdictions provide that the P&Z commission is advisory in 
nature; its recommendations are subject to review and approval by the 
local legislative body. 25 In some states, however, P&Z decisions are ac-
corded more weight than mere recommendations. For example, zoning 
commission decisions in Connecticut, on everything from the adoption 
and amendment of zoning regulations to site plan approval, are fi nal. 26 
In other states, such as Kentucky, the planning commission recommen-
dation regarding a zoning amendment becomes law unless the local leg-
islative body acts to overrule it by majority vote within ninety days. 27 
In other states, commission decisions require a supermajority of the 
 18.  Standard City Planning Enabling Act (Dept. of Commerce 1928),  avail-
able at http://myapa.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/CPEnablingAct1928.pdf. 
 19.  See SSZEA,  supra note 1;  see also  Kmiec ,  supra note 3, § 2.5, at 2-15;  Daniel R. 
Mandelker, Land Use Law § 4.15 (4th ed. 1997) (stating that all state zoning legisla-
tion is based on SSZEA). 
 20. SSZEA, supra note 1 § 6, n.39. 
 21. SCPEA, supra note 18 § 6. 
 22.  See, e.g. ,  Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 89.330, 89.340 (2008). 
 23.  See SSZEA, supra note 1 § 6 n.43 (stating that continuing the commission as a 
permanent body “may not be desirable”). 
 24.  Kmiec ,  supra note 3, at § 4:3;  see, e.g. ,  Mo. Rev. Stat . § 89.370-410 (2008). 
 25.  Kmiec ,  supra note 3, at §§ 4:2, 4:6. 
 26.  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-1— 8-3 (2008). 
 27.  Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann . § 100.211 (West 2008). 
694 The Urban Lawyer  Vol. 40, No. 4  Fall 2008
council to override. For example, in Indiana, the planning commission’s 
adverse recommendation regarding a petition to rezone a particular 
tract of land requires a two-thirds vote of the local legislative body to 
overturn. 28 Even when their decisions are not fi nal, P&Z opinions are 
typically very infl uential, especially if the board is viewed as a neutral, 
expert body insulated from political infl uence. 29 Moreover, on judicial 
review, the recommendation of the P&Z commission can be an impor-
tant factor in determining the reasonableness of the council’s decision. 30 
Thus, the commission wields important, if not always plenary, authority 
in the planning and zoning process. 
 Section 7 of the SSZEA provided for a board of adjustment, again 
appointed by the local legislative body, to be responsible for granting 
“special exceptions” to the zoning ordinance. 31 In particular, the BZA has 
the authority to grant variances from regulations in cases of “unnecessary 
hardship.” 32 Under the SSZEA, the BZA has the fi nal decision on these 
matters, with an appeal directly to the state circuit court. 33 In some states, 
BZA decisions may be appealed in the fi rst instance to the city council. 34 
 Judicial review of zoning decisions is extremely deferential. Courts 
accord local legislative judgments a presumption of validity 35 and de-
cline to overturn city council zoning decisions unless they are arbitrary 
and capricious or unreasonable. 36 P&Z commission decisions that do not 
go through city council ratifi cation are given similar deference. 37 Courts 
 28.  Ind. Code § 36-7-4-609 (2008);  see City of Anderson v. Irving Materials, Inc., 
530 N.E.2d 730, 732 (Ind. 1988). 
 29.  Allensworth ,  supra note 17, at 79 (stating that planning board decisions carry 
considerable weight due to perception of independence). 
 30.  See, e.g. , Walker v. Indian River County, 319 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975). 
 31. SSZEA, at 11. 
 32. SSZEA, at 11; s ee, e.g. , Mo. Rev. Stat. § 89.090 (2008). 
 33. SSZEA, at 11;  see, e.g. , Mo. Rev. Stat. § 89.110 (2008). 
 34.  See, e.g. ,  N.J. Stat. Rev. 40:55D-17 (West 2008). 
 35. Drew v. City of Hattiesburg, 904 So. 2d 138, 140 (Miss. 2005); Lapp v. Village 
of Winnetka, 833 N.E.2d 983, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 36.  See, e.g. , Mayor of Ridgeland v. Estate of Lewis, 963 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2007) (discussing arbitrary and capricious or reasonableness review of zon-
ing amendment decision); Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 50 (Utah 2003) 
(stating that zoning amendment decisions are upheld unless “arbitrary and capricious 
or otherwise illegal”). 
 37.  See, e.g. , Auger v. Strafford, 931 A.2d 1213, 1215 (N.H. 2007) (describing the 
reasonableness standard for review of planning board decision); Markland v. Jasper 
County Planning & Dev. Dep’t., 829 N.E.2d 92, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (applying the 
“clearly erroneous” standard and presumption of correctness to planning board deci-
sions); Harris v. Zoning Comm’n of New Milford, 788 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Conn. 2002) 
(stating that courts will not disturb zoning commission decisions unless they are clearly 
contrary to law or there was an abuse of discretion). 
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also accord BZA decisions a presumption of validity 38 and review them 
using a narrow arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion standard. 39 
Other courts use a reasonableness standard, which they describe as simi-
larly deferential. 40 Because decisions on variances or special exceptions 
may be characterized as “quasi-judicial,” courts generally require sub-
stantial evidence to support the board’s decision. 41 Of course, questions 
involving pure interpretations of law are typically reviewed de novo. 42 
 Deference to the decisions of these zoning bodies is based on a va-
riety of theories. When a city council determination, such as a zoning 
amendment, is involved, courts accord that decision the deference to 
which legislative judgments of elected political bodies are regularly en-
titled. 43 For similar reasons, courts defer to planning and zoning com-
mission decisions that are legislative in nature. 44 
 For decisions that are not legislative, courts treat the zoning body 
as an administrative agency, giving their decisions the same kind of 
deference accorded agency determinations under state administra-
tive procedure acts. 45 Some of the earliest cases involving the review 
 38.  See generally 2  James Metzenbaum ,  The Law of Zoning 931-46 (2d ed. 
1955) (collecting cases giving presumption of validity to BZA decisions); s ee, e.g. , 
State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 676 N.W.2d 401, 405 
(Wis. 2004) (stating that the presumption of validity must be accorded to BZA deci-
sions);  Ackman v. Bd. of Adjustment for Black Hawk County, 596 N.W.2d 96, 106 
( Iowa 1999).
 39.  See, e.g. , Ziervogel, 676 N.W.2d at 405-06 (Wis. 2004) (stating that a BZA deci-
sion will be overturned only when “its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable 
and represented its will and not its judgment”); Conley v. Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals, 353 N.E.2d 594, 597 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that the standard for a BZA appeal 
is “illegality, arbitrariness or abuse of discretion”). 
 40. Ackman, 596 N.W.2d at 106.  
 41. Weaverville Partners LLC v. Weaverville Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 654 S.E.2d 784, 
787 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that the board’s decision was quasi-judicial and pro-
viding the substantial evidence standard); Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 212 
A.2d 153 (N.J. 1965) (same). 
 42. Ziervogel, 676 N.W.2d at 406; Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 957 
P.2d 207, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the board’s interpretation of a statute 
or ordinance is not given deference). 
 43.  See, e.g. , Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. City of Ridgeland, 797 So. 2d 898, 900 (Miss. 
2001) (stating that a city council’s rezoning decision is a legislative act entitled to 
deference). 
 44.  See Arnold Bernhard & Co., Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Comm’n of Westport, 
479 A.2d 801, 807 (Conn. 1984). While there was some movement toward classifying 
zoning amendments as quasi-judicial and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny, see 
Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973), 
this view did not catch on.  William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, The Law of 
Property 620 (3d ed. 2000). 
 45. Hampton House Mgt. Co. v. Brimfi eld Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2007 WL 
4226673, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2007); People’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. 
Surina, 929 A.2d 899, 910 (Md. 2007). 
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of zoning board decisions used the administrative agency rationale to 
establish a deferential standard. Shortly after New York City adopted 
the nation’s fi rst comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916, New York 
courts were faced with appeals from the decisions of these unelected 
bodies, which wielded enormous power over private property. In one 
early decision,  Falvo v. Kerner , the court noted that the board of zoning 
appeals determination “was an administrative function which should 
not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of proof that the 
board . . . abused the discretion with which it was clothed by the ordi-
nance creating it.” 46 
 Although unelected, the zoning board is deemed a “public body” 
whose decisions are entitled to deference. 47 Moreover, as a policy mat-
ter, courts believe citizen boards are in the best position to decide local 
land use questions. 48 As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in an 
early case adopting a deferential standard: 
 Local offi cials who are thoroughly familiar with their community’s characteristics 
and interests and are the proper representatives of its people are undoubtedly the best 
equipped to pass initially on such applications for variance. And their determinations 
should not be approached with a general feeling of suspicion, for as Justice Holmes 
has properly admonished: ‘Universal distrust creates universal incompetence.’ 49 
 However, even in the early cases, the New York courts realized that 
the signifi cant power given to these local bodies could be easily abused; 
therefore, they attempted to give the review process some teeth by re-
quiring that boards adequately support their decisions. Thus, in a 1927 
case, the New York Court of Appeals overturned a variance granted 
for building a garage based on “unnecessary hardship,” where the only 
evidence was that variances had been granted before in similar circum-
stances. 50 The court refused to affi rm without evidence of hardship on 
the record, stating  “[t]here has been confi ded to the board a delicate 
 46. Falvo v. Kerner, 222 A.D. 289, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927); s ee also People ex 
rel. Werner v. Walsh, 212 A.D. 635, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925) (stating that a board 
of appeals’ exercise of “administrative function” should not be overturned absent dis-
crimination or grave abuse of discretion). 
 47.  See, e.g. , C. Miller Chevrolet, Inc. v. City of Willoughby Hills, 313 N.E.2d 400, 
403-04 (Ohio 1974) (stating that the BZA is a “public body” whose decisions are there-
fore entitled to a presumption of validity). 
 48.  Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts ,  Land Use Plan-
ning and Control Law 258 (1998) (stating that the reasons courts adopt deferential 
standards include the board’s expertise and familiarity with local conditions). 
 49. Ward v. Scott, 105 A.2d 851, 855 (N.J. 1954) (quoting Graham v. United States, 
231 U.S. 474, 480 (1913); s ee also Kramer, 212 A.2d at 169. 
 50. People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh, 155 N.E. 575, 578 
(N.Y. 1927). 
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jurisdiction and one easily abused. Upon a showing of unnecessary 
hardship, general rules are suspended for the benefi t of individual own-
ers and special privileges established. . . . Disclosure is the antidote to 
partiality and favor.” 51 
 Aside from ensuring that their decisions are adequately supported, 
however, courts have found few methods of ensuring board impartiality, 
because their decisions are often inherently political. For that reason, 
the Maryland Supreme Court found that vesting the board of zoning ap-
peals with the power to grant variances from zoning ordinances was an 
unconstitutional delegation of an essentially legislative function. 52 The 
court warned that the system was fraught with the danger of favoritism 
and bias: 
 It is an unequal and partial law that permits an administrative board, in its discretion, 
to free a specifi c piece of property from universal regulations and restrictions which 
are imposed for the general benefi t of all property within the defi ned area of which 
the freed property is a part. . . . [I]t partakes of the nature of special legislation for a 
private interest, and hence fi nds no basis in the general welfare. . . . Abstractly con-
sidered there is much force in the argument that the board of zoning appeals should 
have powers of variation and suspension to correct excessive burdens imposed by 
the enforcement of the regulations in the several districts of a comprehensive zon-
ing system; but, in its concrete result, this rule of expediency to relieve individual 
hardship is productive of inequality, popular discontent, and inferences or charges 
of favoritism. 53 
 Given this susceptibility to at least the appearance of bias and the 
importance of the property interests at stake, it seems crucial to ensure 
that the citizen zoning boards truly represent a cross-section of the com-
munity, rather than being populated with those with a vested interest 
in the development process. Indeed, the deference courts give to these 
unelected boards is largely grounded in the belief that they are neutral 
administrative bodies, composed of “the proper representatives” of the 
people, as the New Jersey Supreme Court put it. 54 In reality, however, 
zoning boards often do not comport with this ideal, as the following 
section details. 
 51.  Id. 
 52. Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist Protestant Church, 165 A. 703, 707 (Md.
1933). 
 53.  Id . at 706-07. Most courts fi nd no improper delegation, as long as the administra-
tive decisionmaker has been provided with suffi cient standards.  See generally  Kmiec , 
 supra note 3, at § 4:19. 
 54. Ward v. Scott, 105 A.2d 851, 855 (N.J. 1954). Similarly, the SSZEA speaks of 
the zoning commission as “an outside body of representative citizens.” SSZEA,  supra 
note 1, at 9 n.39. 
698 The Urban Lawyer  Vol. 40, No. 4  Fall 2008
 III.  National Study of Zoning Board 
Occupational Composition 
 For this article, a research team from Drake University Law School 
surveyed the zoning boards of the most populous cities in the coun-
try, to determine whether the skew toward white-collar and develop-
ment-related board members, which Robert Walker identifi ed in 1937, 
persists in modern zoning boards. This study builds on the results 
of two more limited surveys recently conducted by Drake research-
ers. The fi rst study examined the occupations of zoning board mem-
bers in Iowa municipalities. 55 The results indicated that, especially 
in larger cities, Iowa zoning boards were overwhelmingly populated 
with white-collar occupants: although less than a third of Iowa’s citi-
zens held professional, managerial and technical jobs, they comprised 
about 74% of BZA members and 80% of P&Z members in Iowa cit-
ies with populations over 25,000. 56 Moreover, the study found that 
boards typically included many individuals who had a direct interest 
in land development—realtors, lenders, builders, contractors, and ar-
chitects, for example—and that some boards were dominated by those 
with such interests. 57 About 30% of all Iowa zoning board members 
held jobs directly related to development activity, and another 16-
20% could be said to be at least indirectly benefi tted by increased 
development. 58 
 A follow-up study examined zoning boards in Oregon, to determine 
the effi cacy of legislation restricting the occupational composition of 
zoning boards. 59 Oregon attempts to achieve broader occupational dis-
tribution by prohibiting the selection of more than two P&Z commis-
sion members from the same occupational category. 60 Moreover, no 
more than two of the commission members may be “engage[d] prin-
cipally in the buying, selling or developing of real estate.” 61 The study 
revealed that these restrictions did not remedy the skew toward  white-
collar  occupations. In cities with populations greater than 25,000, over 
90% of Oregon’s P&Z commissioners were drawn from the profes-
 55. Anderson & Sass,  supra note 7. 
 56.  Id . at 464. 
 57.  Id . at 467. 
 58.  Id . at 465-68. 
 59. Jerry L. Anderson & Daniel Luebbering,  Zoning Bias II: A Study of Oregon’s 
Zoning Commission Composition Restrictions , 38  Urb. Law . 63 (2006). 
 60.  Or. Rev. Stat. § 227.030(4) (2007). 
 61.  Id. 
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sional, technical, or managerial professions. 62 The law did reduce the 
number of members with a direct interest in development; nevertheless, 
we identifi ed about a fourth of board members who had occupations di-
rectly related to development and several cities with boards dominated 
by development interests. 63 
 While these fi rst two studies were instructive, we were unable to 
make any judgments about the composition of zoning boards nation-
wide. Therefore, for this paper we undertook a comprehensive survey 
of all major cities in the United States, to determine defi nitively who 
sits on the nation’s zoning boards. 
 A. Study Design 
 In fall 2006, we sent a survey to a selection of large cities across the 
country, requesting information on the occupations of members of their 
P&Z commissions and BZA. The selected cities included: 1) the one 
hundred most populous cities in the country, according to the 2000 cen-
sus results, and 2) the fi ve most populous cities in every state, in order to 
ensure geographic diversity. We received 119 usable survey responses 
from this mailing. Because some of the largest cities in the country 
declined to respond to the survey, we then gathered additional occupa-
tional information by searching the city government web pages of the 
most populous cities. We were ultimately able to obtain data for 137 
major United States cities. 
 The subject cities ranged in size from New York City (population just 
over 8 million) to Cupertino, California (population just over 50,000). 64 
Most of the respondents were small to mid-size cities, but the respon-
dents also represent a good sample of the larger cities. For example, we 
have data on eighteen out of the twenty-nine largest United States cities. 
 Table 1 shows the populations of the cities for which we were able 
to obtain data. 
 The survey includes occupational data for a total of 442 BZA mem-
bers and 982 P&Z commission members. The surveys identifi ed fewer 
 62. Anderson & Luebbering,  supra note 59, at 72-73, Tables 3 & 4. In all cities 
surveyed, about 75% of board members are white-collar, about twice the percentage in 
the Oregon labor force.  Id. 
 63.  Id . at 76-77, Table 5. 
 64.  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing (2006). 
Population data was taken from 2000 census and includes only the population within 
the city’s corporate boundaries. Metropolitan area data may be much different, but is 
not relevant to our survey, which is based on boards with authority only within the city 
limits (although some boards have limited authority a short distance outside of city 
limits as well). 
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BZA members for several reasons. Some states, such as Oregon, 65 do 
not use a BZA, and in others, such as California, cities have the op-
tion of using a zoning administrator or the planning commission for 
typical BZA functions. 66 Moreover, in many cities the P&Z commission 
has more members than the city’s BZA (Oklahoma City, for example, 
has nine P&Z members, but only fi ve BZA members). In addition, for 
the follow-up investigation of web site information for larger cities, we 
concentrated on P&Z members’ occupational data, which is more read-
ily available on-line. 
 We asked each city to identify the occupation of each member of 
its P&Z commission and BZA. We then classifi ed the occupations 
using the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, published by the Depart-
ment of Labor. 67 This system classifi es occupations into nine basic 
categories: 
 1. professional, technical, and managerial occupations; 
 2. clerical and sales occupations; 




Very Large ( pop. over 
500,000)
18 New York, LA, Chicago, 
Dallas, Jacksonville, 
Nashville
Large ( pop. 250,000 
to 499,000)
13 New Orleans, Las Vegas, 
Tulsa, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, 
Omaha 
Mid-size ( pop. 100,000 
to 249,000)
51 Birmingham, Durham, 
Dayton, Glendale, Augusta, 
Ft. Wayne
Small ( pop. under 100,000) 55 Ogden, Beaverton, Appleton, 
Santa Fe, Rapid City, Gulfport
 65.  See Anderson & Luebbering,  supra note 59, at 67-68 (describing the Oregon 
system). 
 66. Cal. Gov. Code § 65901 (providing that either the zoning administrator or BZA 
may issue conditional use permits or variances); Cal. Gov. Code  § 65902 (stating that 
if a city or county has neither BZA nor zoning administrator, the planning commission 
may exercise those functions); s ee, e.g. , Sacramento City Code, Title 17 (describing the 
authority of the zoning administrator regarding variances, special permits and develop-
ment plans). 
 67.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th ed. 1991). 
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 3. service occupations; 
 4. agricultural, fi shery, forestry, and related occupations; 
 5. processing occupations; 
 6. machines trades occupations; 
 7. benchwork occupations; 
 8. structural work occupations; and 
 9. miscellaneous occupations. 68 
 For the purposes of summarizing our results, we combined the small 
numbers of individuals in categories 5-8 in one “Processing and Labor” 
category and placed anyone in the “Miscellaneous” category in the 
group that most closely fi t their occupation. We also added a “Home-
maker” category, which is not included in the Department of Labor 
classifi cations. 
 B. Study Results 
 The national data show that American zoning boards are overwhelm-
ingly populated with members from white-collar occupations. As shown 
in Table 2, three-quarters of both P&Z commissions and BZA are drawn 
from Professional, Technical and Managerial (PTM) occupations, over 
twice their representation in the overall workforce. Laborers are the 
most underrepresented group, occupying just 1-2% of the seats on these 
boards, despite making up almost a quarter of the employed population. 
 The Clerical/Sales group is closer to being proportionately rep-
resented, with 13% of P&Z commission and 16% of BZA members, 
compared with their workforce percentage of 27%. However, real estate 
agents comprised the largest segment of this group: on the P&Z com-
missions, there were fi fty-four real estate agents out of the 111 clerical 
and sales members, and on the BZA, thirty-nine out of fi fty-nine cleri-
cal/sales members were real estate agents. Thus, outside of real estate 
agents, clerical and sales occupations are also signifi cantly underrep-
resented. Agriculture is almost totally excluded, which is not surpris-
ing since there are few agricultural uses within the city limits of large 
municipalities. Nevertheless, the failure to include agricultural interests 
means that their unique perspective on issues like the conversion of 
farmland to development use is not considered in municipal land use 
decision-making. 69 
 These numbers are remarkably consistent with Robert Walker’s 
1937 study, which found that 79.4% of large city planning and zoning 
 68.  Id . at xviii. 
 69.  See infra Part IV.D.1. (discussing zoning opinions of citizens with agricultural 
occupations). 
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commission members were drawn from the ranks of PTM occupations. 70 
Our two previous surveys, focusing on Iowa and Oregon, also identifi ed 
a very similar skew toward white-collar members. 
 The Iowa/Oregon surveys also found that, as city size increases, the 
percentage of board members in the PTM class increases. In the Iowa 
survey, for example, the smallest towns (less than 2500 population) had 
only 41% PTM members on their P&Z commissions, increasing steadily 
as population increased to 74% for cities over 25,000. 71 Similarly, in Or-
egon the smaller towns had 68% PTM members, increasing to over 90% 
in cities over 25,000. 72 In the nationwide survey, however, the relation-
ship between city size and proportion of white-collar board members 
was not well-defi ned, as Table 3 shows. Certainly, the largest cities had 
P&Z commissions made up almost entirely of those with PTM occupa-
tions. For mid-size and smaller cities, however, there was no identifi able 
trend. Of course, all the cities in the national survey would have been in 
the largest category of the Iowa/Oregon studies. 
 While the data showing a skew toward white-collar board members is 
interesting, it is not the complete story. The PTM category, for  example, 
Table 2: Members by Occupational Category
 Occupational 
Category
P & Z Commission
   Members Percent
Board of Adjust.
   Members Percent




Managerial 790 80 333 75 34
Clerical and 
Sales 111 11 69 16 27
Service 36 4 20 5 15
Processing, 
Labor 10 1 10 2 24
Agricultural 5 1 1 <1 1
Homemaker 30 3 9 2 n/a
TOTAL 982 100 442 100 100
 70.  See Anderson & Sass,  supra note 7, at 458. 
 71.  See Anderson & Sass,  supra note 7, at 464. 
 72.  See Anderson & Luebbering,  supra note 59, at 72. 
*PETER FRONCZEK & PATRICIA JOHNSON, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OCCUPATIONS
2000 1–2, 8 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-25.pdf. Because 
the census fi gures include only those employed outside the home, these percentages do not include 
homemakers or other non-compensated occupations.
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is a large classifi cation that includes everyone from attorneys to en-
gineers to small business owners. To fully discover who is sitting on 
our zoning boards, we looked at the specifi c occupations within these 
groups. Table 4 shows the total number and percentage of board mem-
bers by specifi c occupation. 
 The top four occupations on both boards—business, real estate, poli-
tics, and law—account for 57% of P&Z commission members and 68% 
of BZA members. Those in the real estate category represent a sig-
nifi cant portion by themselves (18% P&Z; 22% BZA). If that group 
is added to others which are related to the development process, such 
as bankers (mortgages), planners, and architects—over 30% of board 
members have some vested interest in development. Of course, many of 
the attorneys and engineers may also work in real estate development 
as well. 
 On the other hand, some balance is refl ected in the presence of a sig-
nifi cant group of educators. Some of these, particularly in larger cities, 
were professors of urban planning or something similar, who would 
bring an expertise and broader perspective to the board. In addition, 
many of the boards achieved balance by including public housing or 
charitable group offi cials, who were represented in about the same pro-
portion as bankers or planners. 
 However, it is easy to see what occupations are not at the table. Only 
1-2% of the members are laborers, meaning that the blue-collar worker 
has virtually no voice in this process, although in some cities politi-
cal representatives from blue-collar districts may indirectly represent 
those interests. Even though a fair number of members were classi-
fi ed in “clerical/sales” occupations, for the most part they were either 
real estate agents, insurance brokers, or paralegals, who may have some 
direct or indirect interest in development. Thus, as Robert Walker sug-
gested, the view of the “ordinary citizen” is not represented with this 
occupational composition. 
Table 3: Percentage of PTM Board Members by City Size
City size P&Z BZA
above 500,000 94 n/a* 
250,000 to 500,000 73 77
100,000 to 250,000 79 70
under 100,000 77 80
*We did not obtain BZA data for the largest cities in the survey.
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Table 4: Board Members by Specifi c  Occupation
Occupation
P&Z Commission 
Number   Percent
BOA 
Number    Percent




sales, appraisal) 177 18 95 22
Politics, 
government 108 11 37 8
Attorney, 
paralegal 100 10 60 14
Education 63 6 23 5
Architect, 
landscape arch. 61 6 25 6
Engineering 52 5 20 5
Banking 34 3 9 2
Insurance, fi nancial 
planning 29 3 13 3
Planning 28 3 4 1
Charity, social 
work 27 3 7 2
Medical 27 3 7 2
Homemaker 26 3 7 2
Science, technology 20 2 3 1
Community devel., 
public housing 18 2 4 1
Artist, writer, 
editor 11 1 3 1
Military 10 1 5 1
Labor 5 1 7 2
Religion 5 1 3 1
Agriculture* 1 0 1 0
Other, retired 3 0 4 1
TOTAL 982 100 441 100
*Table 2 shows fi ve P&Z members in the agricultural group; however, two of those members 
were only part-time farmers and for this table were placed in another category. Another member 
was an irrigation contractor, which is an agricultural classifi cation for Table 2, but here falls under 
the real estate development group.
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 The board composition totals may refl ect a philosophy of treating 
zoning boards as economic development tools. City offi cials may per-
ceive that facilitating “growth” is the main object of city planning. 73 
Of course, many planning or zoning board members obtain their seats 
precisely because they represent a group with a vested interest in the 
planning process. Rather than attempt to identify “neutral” citizens, 
a city may instead try to strike a balance between various competing 
interests. 
 New York City’s Planning Commission perfectly illustrates the com-
position issue. The Commission, when surveyed in 2007, consisted of 
thirteen board members. Every single Commission member was drawn 
from the professional, managerial, technical class and every single 
member had at least an indirect and in many cases a direct interest in 
development activity. The Commission included three architects, two 
attorneys, fi ve executives from housing or community development or-
ganizations, one real estate broker, one executive of a construction com-
pany, and one engineer. Granted, several of the development executives 
worked in the affordable or low-income housing area. Nevertheless, 
every single member had some sort of vested interest in the develop-
ment process and none could be said to represent the point of view of 
the “average citizen.” 
 C. Conclusion 
 Judicial deference to zoning board decisions is based on the assump-
tion that they are neutral administrative bodies representing a fair cross-
 section of the community. 74 The actual composition of these boards, 
however, cannot be fairly said to refl ect the average citizen’s point 
of view. Unless municipalities begin to appoint more representative 
boards, legitimate questions may be raised about the appropriateness of 
judicial deference. 
 IV.  Survey of Public Attitudes Toward Land 
Use Issues 
 Given the skew toward white-collar occupations, we were interested in 
determining the extent to which demographic variables affected attitudes 
 73.  Marion Clawson & Peter Hall, Planning and Urban Growth: An 
Anglo-American Comparison 181 (1972) (describing the prevailing American at-
titude favoring growth and development). 
 74.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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toward zoning issues. For example, even though the labor group is al-
most totally excluded from board representation, would more blue- collar 
presence actually make a difference in the decision-making process? We 
therefore devised a survey to test attitudes toward land use questions and 
analyzed the results by a number of demographic characteristics. 
 A. Study Design 
 During the summer of 2007, Drake researchers surveyed Iowa residents 
regarding their attitudes toward specifi c land use control issues. The 
survey was conducted at various public locations, to ensure a diverse set 
of respondents. The locations included sporting events, city parks, and 
ethnic festivals in central Iowa. The survey respondents were volunteers 
and were typically compensated for their time with nominal gifts, such 
as a bottle of water or a $5 gift certifi cate. The researchers attempted 
to ensure that the results included a signifi cant number of respondents 
in all demographic categories. We received a total of 801 usable re-
sponses. About 42% of the respondents held occupations in the profes-
sional, managerial, and technical category, slightly above their share of 
the nation’s workforce (34%), while the rest were distributed among the 
non-professional occupations. 
 B. Survey Summary 
 The survey instrument asks the subject to assume that they are a mem-
ber of the city’s planning and zoning commission. The basic role of the 
planning and zoning commission is explained briefl y. The subject then is 
asked a series of questions about issues that may come before the com-
mission. For each question, the subject has a choice of fi ve responses: 
Defi nitely Yes, Probably Yes, Unsure, Probably No, and Defi nitely No. 
Table 5: Occupations of Survey Respondents
Occupational Group Percent of Respondents
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The subject is then asked to provide demographic information regard-
ing his or her occupation, educational level, annual family income, race, 
age, and home ownership. The complete survey instrument is included 
in this article as Appendix 1. 
 The survey focuses on controversial issues on which Robert Walker’s 
“ordinary citizen” might be expected to take a different position than 
the white-collar professional, particularly one with ties to business or 
development interests. Thus, the survey asks whether a big box store 
should be granted a zoning amendment, despite the adverse impacts of 
the project on a moderate-income neighborhood. Another question fo-
cuses on whether a gated community should be required to allow public 
access. Other questions concern development exactions, historic pres-
ervation, and sustainable development. The survey questions are sum-
marized below, along with the background of each issue. 
 QUESTIONS 1-3:  THE BIG BOX STORE VS. 
NEIGHBORHOOD CONCERNS 
 The survey’s fi rst three questions concerned a proposal to build a big-
box store on land presently zoned agricultural, located adjacent to a 
modest residential area, consisting of small houses on small lots. The 
development would require a zoning change from agricultural to com-
mercial. The change is supported by city leaders, eager for additional 
development, but opposed by neighbors, who are concerned about ad-
ditional noise, traffi c, and loss of privacy. 
 Question 1 asks whether the subject would vote to recommend the 
zoning change in these circumstances. Question 2 asks whether the sub-
ject would require the developer to screen the site with bushes or a fence, 
at a cost of $75,000, to reduce the impact on neighbors. The developer 
claims that this expense might render the project infeasible. Question 3 
asks whether the subject would allow the developer to straighten a 
stream running through the site, turning it into a concrete culvert. The 
developer claims that if the stream is left in its natural, meandering, lo-
cation, the smaller buildable area will render the project unworkable. 
 These questions were designed to determine how much value the 
subject placed on economic development as opposed to neighborhood 
and environmental concerns. Zoning amendments to allow big box 
retail are quite common, 75 but can generate signifi cant neighborhood 
 75. For a summary of empirical research on frequency of zoning amendments, see 
Ellickson & Been,  supra note 6, at 346-47. 
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 opposition due to increased traffi c, noise, and other impacts. 76 Because 
the neighborhood was depicted as modest, our hypothesis was that the 
“ordinary citizen” imagined by Robert Walker might be more protective 
of the surrounding neighborhood, compared with those who normally 
sit on zoning boards. 77 
 QUESTION 4: EXACTIONS 
 Question 4 asks whether the subject favors a requirement that every 
new residential development be required to provide a portion of the de-
velopment for public recreational needs. Exactions for public park and 
recreation uses are strongly opposed by many developers, builders and 
business leaders seeking economic growth. 78 The National Association 
of Home Builders, for example, states as a matter of policy that the cost 
of improvements designed to serve the entire community, such as parks, 
should be fi nanced by taxes rather than by exactions on new develop-
ment. 79 Municipalities, however, have increasingly relied on exactions 
to provide public amenities. 80 
 From a legal standpoint, such exactions are permissible provided 
that the municipality has adequate statutory authority 81 and stays within 
constitutional bounds. In  Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n 82 and 
 Dolan v. City of Tigard , 83 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution 
allows exactions only where an adequate nexus exists between the re-
quirement and the projected impact of the development. 84 In addition, 
the exaction must bear a “rough proportionality” to the nature and extent 
of the added burden on public services posed by the new development. 85 
 76.  See, e.g. , Stacy Mitchell, Big Box Swindle: The Fight to Reclaim America from 
Retail Giants,  http://www.alternet.org/story/45166/ (last vistited Sept. 20, 2008) (de-
scribing opposition to big box retail proposals in several communities). 
 77.  See  Allensworth ,  supra note 17, at 80-81 (describing study that determined 
zoning board members representing citizen groups voted against rezonings at “signifi -
cantly greater rate than those supported by developers). 
 78.  Marla Dresch & Steven M. Scheffrin, Who Pays for Development Fees 
and Exactions? , http://www.ppic.org (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) (stating that business 
groups claim exactions impede economic growth). 
 79.  See National Association of Home Builders, http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?
sectionID=893&genericContentID=3518 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
 80.  Mandelker ,  supra note 19, at 398. 
 81. Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines, 644 
N.W.2d 339, 350 (Iowa 2002) (stating that a city parkland dedication ordinance was tax 
not authorized by state statute). 
 82. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 83. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 84.  Id . at 386. 
 85.  Id . at 391. 
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Park and recreation exactions such as the one proposed here have been 
upheld under the  Nollan/Dolan constitutional test. 86 
 This question is designed to see whether the “ordinary citizen” might 
be more willing to favor burdens on developers that benefi t the com-
munity, even if it might impede growth. 
 QUESTION 5: GATED COMMUNITY ACCESS 
 Question 5 presents a hypothetical proposal for a gated community, 
which would present an inconvenient barrier to public access to a hiking/
biking trail, and asks whether the subject favors requiring the gated 
community to allow public access to the development’s streets and 
 sidewalks. 
 Gated communities, already home to millions of Americans, are the 
fastest-growing form of residential development. 87 Motivated primarily 
by the desire for increased security, these areas privatize space that was 
previously public, preventing access by non-residents. 88 At least one 
scholar has argued that this may, in some cases, impermissibly infringe 
on the constitutional right to travel. 89 Some communities have restricted 
or even banned gated developments due to their adverse effects on the 
public. 90 
 Among the unintended consequences of the gated development are 
a sense of exclusion and social segregation. 91  The consequences of the 
privatization of space should be considered immediately apparent and 
widely signifi cant to sociological study. Public spaces are centers of 
integration where individuals of widely divergent social factors—age, 
race, ethnicity, income, etc.—work, live, and recreate in close proxim-
ity. Public space contributes to egalitarianism and liberalism by foster-
ing unplanned social interactions between individuals who would not 
otherwise associate with one another. However, studies into housing 
 86. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821 (N.Y. 2003) (up-
holding $1500 per lot parkland fee ordinance). 
 87. Setha M. Low,  Imprisoned by the Walls Built to Keep ‘the Others’ Out ,  L.A. 
Times, Dec. 19, 2003,  available at http://www.hba.org.my/news/2003/1203/impris
oned.htm. In 2001, 7 million U.S. homes were located in gated environments.  Id. 
 88.  See generally  Edward J. Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder, Fortress America: 
Gated Communities in the United States 126 (Brookings Institute Press 1997) 
(stating that 70% of residents said security was very important in their decision to live 
in a gated community). 
 89. David J. Kennedy,  Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Im-
pact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers , 105  Yale L. J . 761, 769-70 (1995). 
 90. Blakely & Snyder,  supra note 88, at 156-60. 
 91.  Id. 
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trends showed that an increasing number of city dwellers seek to es-
cape the modern urban landscape in favor of communities comprised 
of individuals whose social characteristics match their own. As a result, 
private spaces become acutely homogenized places, contributing to the 
spatial stratifi cation of the urban landscape. 92 
 Many social scientists lament that every new gated community de-
tracts from the overall public space available. “As public spaces are lost, 
so too are the opportunities for shared experience and positive interac-
tion among individuals from diverse backgrounds.” 93 
 Historically, gated communities have been seen as mostly white 
professional enclaves, contributing to social segregation by race and 
class. 94 Thus, this question was designed to determine whether the 
groups typically excluded–minorities, blue-collar workers, or those 
with lower incomes–would be more likely to impose access require-
ments. Recent studies suggest, however, that gated communities are be-
coming more popular with the middle class and a variety of ethnic and 
racial groups. 95 
 QUESTION 6: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 Question 6 asks whether the subject favors requiring developers to use 
more sustainable building practices, even if it increases the cost of the 
development by 10%. Recent years have seen an explosion of “green 
building” codes, as cities and counties attempt to reverse decades of 
conventional subdivision controls that exacerbate environmental prob-
lems. 96 For example, instead of drainage systems that channel stormwa-
ter runoff into curb and gutter systems, which adversely impact water 
quality, low impact development strategies may include on-site reten-
tion of stormwater using native vegetation or increased use of  permeable 
 92. Elena Vesselinov, Matthew Cazessus & William Falk,  Gated Communities and 
Spatial Inequality , 29  J. Urb. Aff. 109, 111 (2007). 
 93.  Id. 
 94. Setha M. Low,  The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse 
of Urban Fear , 103  Am. Anthropologist 45 (2001) (stating that the gated community 
“produces a landscape that encodes class relations and residential (race/class/ethnic/
gender) segregation more permanently in the built environment”). 
 95. Vesselinov,  supra note 92, at 113. The 2001 American Housing Survey of the 
U.S. South and West shows that Asians and Hispanics have the highest percentages of 
their overall populations living in gated communities (12.4% and 8.3% respectively), 
while 7.2% of white and 3.5% of black homeowners are gated.  Id . at 115. 
 96.  See Smart Communities Network, http://www.smartcommunities.ncat.org/build
ings/gbcodtoc.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
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pavement. 97 Developers, however, may believe that these practices are 
too costly or restrictive. 98 
 This question was designed to see whether changing the demographic 
characteristics of zoning boards would hasten or impede the trend to-
wards sustainable development requirements. 
 QUESTIONS 7-8: HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
 Questions 7 and 8 deal with historic preservation in an area described 
as replete with residential and commercial buildings “built in the 1920s 
in a particularly attractive architectural style.” A developer plans to 
take down several of the buildings in order to construct a modern offi ce 
building. Question 7 asks whether the subject favors historic preserva-
tion restrictions in these circumstances. Question 8 asks whether the 
subject would favor historic preservation restrictions if property owners 
are compensated by tax reductions or incentives. 
 Historic preservation is largely a matter of local law. Federal law 
provides designated historic buildings or districts with grant funding 
opportunities and tax incentives and offers some protection from detri-
mental federal projects. 99 Restrictions on the destruction or modifi cation 
of historic property, however, are found primarily at the local level. 100 
Local preservation ordinances became very popular in the latter part of 
the 20 th century. In 1975, 421 communities had preservation controls; 
by 2002, over 2300 communities had them. 101 
 The enactment of an historic preservation ordinance can be extremely 
controversial. 102 Ordinances typically impose signifi cant restrictions on 
  97. For examples of ordinances requiring or encouraging this type of low impact 
design, see Marisa Romero & Mark E. Hostetler,  Policies That Address Sustainable Site 
Development , http://edis.ifas.ufl .edu/UW254 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
  98. However, many builders now support the green building movement, citing cost-
effi ciency and marketability.  See Michael Hinman,  Panel: Green Building Movement 
Here to Stay, More Cost Effi cient ,  Tampa Bay Bus. J. , Nov. 13, 2007,  available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/tampabay/stories/2007/11/12/daily16.html. 
  99. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2008). 
 100. There are some state-level statutory protections against the destruction of his-
toric properties,  see, e.g. ,  Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-51-1201 to -1204 (2008), but most 
state statutes merely authorize local governments to enact protection ordinances.  See, 
e.g. ,  Colo. Rev. Stat . § 29-20-104,  Ga. Code Ann.  §§ 44-10-20 to -31 (2007). 
 101.  See Tad Heuer, Note,  Living History: How Homeowners in a New Local His-
toric District Negotiate Their Legal Obligations , 116  Yale L.J. 768, 772-73 (2007). 
 102.  See, e.g. , Carole Townsend,  Preservation Confrontation: Norcross Removes 
Historic Property Protection Ordinance for the Second Time in 20 Years ,  Gwinnett 
Daily Post, Feb. 24, 2008,  available at http://www.gwinnettdailypost.com. City coun-
cil enacted historic preservation ordinance, but soon retracted it when some property 
owners complained.  Id. 
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property owners and may increase the cost of maintaining the prop-
erty. 103 However, owners living in a historic district may feel that the ad-
ditional burden is worth the benefi t of similar restrictions on neighboring 
properties. 104 Clearly, the public at large is benefi tted by the restrictions, 
which can effectively turn neighborhoods into outdoor museums. 
 C. Overall Survey Results 
 Table 5 shows the total affi rmative and negative responses in each 
category. The results group together the “probably” and “defi nitely” 
responses for simplicity. The table shows the percentage of total respon-
dents who answered affi rmatively. The next column subtracts the “un-
sure” responses and shows the percentage of those with an opinion who 
answered affi rmatively. Finally, in order to determine the “average” re-
sponse, we assigned each response a numerical value. “Defi nitely yes” 
was scored as 2, “probably yes” was scored as 1, “unsure” was scored 
as 0, “probably no” was scored as 1, and “defi nitely no” was scored as 2. 
For each question, those scores were then totaled and averaged to deter-
mine the average response. Thus, 2.0 would be the highest possible af-
fi rmative score, 2.0 would be the highest negative score, while a score 
near 0 would indicate that the average respondent was neutral on the 
issue. A score around 1.0 indicates that the average respondent was 
leaning toward the proposition—a “probably yes” response. 
 The results show the average citizen may be less interested in eco-
nomic development and more concerned about urban sprawl or the 
impacts of commercial enterprises on residential neighborhoods. With 
regard to big box rezoning, for example, only about half of the re-
spondents would grant the application. The average response was .06, 
which is almost exactly neutral. Yet, this is a typical zoning amendment 
granted in cities across the country every day and is especially favored 
in areas desiring “economic growth.” 105 Moreover, if the development 
proceeds, about three-quarters of respondents likely would require a 
screen to protect nearby residents and 70% would require the stream to 
be left intact, despite the developer’s diffi culties. The average response 
to these questions was .85 and .83, respectively, which is well into the 
 103.  See Heuer,  supra note 101, at 799-800 (describing owners’ diffi culties comply-
ing with historic preservation controls). 
 104.  Id . at 786-87 (describing an empirical study of owners in a historic district that 
fi nds the majority felt advantages outweighed the disadvantages). 
 105. For a description of the typical city approach to “deal-making” with development 
interests and a summary of empirical studies on zoning amendments, see Ellickson & 
Been,  supra note 6, at 342-47. 
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“probably yes” category. Again, this seems to illustrate that the aver-
age citizen has signifi cant concerns about development impacts on the 
environment and the neighborhood. 
 Similarly, despite the controversial nature of recreational exactions, 
86% of those with an opinion favored requiring new developments 
to contribute toward public park and recreation facilities. This ques-
tion generated the highest average response (.94). On the question of 
gated access, about two-thirds of all respondents and three-quarters of 
those with an opinion would require public access. While the affi rma-
tive response to this question was slightly lower than the answers to 
the development exaction and screen/stream conditions questions, this 
is a signifi cant result given that the ability to prevent public access is 
the signal characteristic of a gated community and one that is rarely 
compromised by zoning boards. 106 Again, these results indicate that the 
average citizen may have a different opinion than a typical zoning board 
member. 
 In addition, a healthy majority favored measures to require sustain-
able development techniques and historic preservation, despite the fact 
 106.  See, e.g. , Howard Blume,  La Habra Shuts the Gates ,  L.A. Times , Sept. 20, 1990 
at J7 (describing the city’s ban on gated communities as extremely rare, if not unprec-
edented);  see also Kauai Mayor Slams Gated Communities ,  Honolulu Star Bulle-
tin , (Feb. 10, 2008),  available at http://starbulletin.com/2008/02/10/news/story07.html 
(describing recent effort to ban gated communities in Kauai). University of Hawai’i 
law professor David Callies criticized the plan on the basis that the constitution allows 
private landowners to exclude the public.  Id. 
Table 6: Overall Survey Results
Question
Affi rmative Percent 
of Total Responses
Affi rmative 




Q1: Big Box Rezoning 46 54 .06
Q2: Screen Require 74 83 .85
Q3: Stream Preserve 70 79 .83
Q4: Rec Exaction 76 86 .94
Q5: Gated Access 66 74 .68
Q6: Sustain Develop 69 86 .79
Q7: Historic Pres. 63 79 .65
Q8: Hist. Pres. w/taxes 65 85 .69
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that neither is required in the communities in which the survey was 
taken. Again, this suggests that the overall community is more willing 
to regulate land use and development than a typical zoning board might 
be. The historic preservation questions, however, did not generate as 
strong of an affi rmative response as the questions on recreational exac-
tions and neighborhood and stream protection. 
 Overall, these results portray citizens who may not care as much 
about “growth” or “economic development” as they do about ensuring 
that growth is done the right way—with due regard for neighbors, natu-
ral amenities, sustainable development, public recreational needs, and 
historic preservation. The results suggest that a board composed of a 
broader cross section of citizens might make different decisions than a 
typical zoning board. The next section attempts to determine whether 
these opinions vary according to demographic characteristics. 
 D. Survey Results by Demographic Variables 
 Each survey respondent was asked to provide demographic data: age, 
educational level, income, home ownership, race, and occupation. Our 
hypothesis was that many of these factors would correlate with signifi -
cant differences in opinion on zoning matters. The object was to deter-
mine whether having more diverse zoning boards might lead to better 
representation of competing concerns. 
 For many demographic variables, the survey did not reveal many sig-
nifi cant differences between categories. This suggests that, at least for 
broad demographic categories, planning and zoning decisions would 
not be appreciably affected by greater diversity of board members. 
However, a closer analysis reveals that certain factors do result in dif-
ferences in zoning preferences. Those differences discussed below rise 
to the level of statistical signifi cance, unless we specifi cally indicate 
otherwise. 107 
 For each demographic variable, the fi rst table summarizes the total 
percentage of affi rmative responses to each question. “Defi nitely yes” 
and “probably yes” responses were combined for these tables in order 
to obtain the total number of affi rmative answers. For these percent-
age tables, the uncertain responses were disregarded, meaning that 
these are percentages of those who had an opinion. The second table 
in each category shows the average response of each group to each 
 107. Statistical signifi cance exists when a difference between samples/responses is 
large enough so as to be attributed to something other than expected sampling error. 
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question. 108 The following sections detail the responses for each de-
mographic variable. 
 1. OCCUPATION 
 This survey was intended to determine whether increasing diversity of 
occupations on zoning boards would impact the decision-making pro-
cess. As a group, the responses of non-professionals were almost identi-
cal to the responses of professionals on every issue. 109 Non-professional 
respondents were only slightly less likely to recommend the big box 
rezoning than the white-collar group (53% to 56%, no statistical signifi -
cance). Similarly, the two groups were almost equally likely to require 
screening (84% and 83%). The professional group was slightly more 
likely to leave the stream intact (82% versus 78%) and slightly less 
likely to require gated community access (71% versus 76%), but the 
differences were not statistically signifi cant. On the remaining ques-
tions, the responses were virtually indistinguishable. 
 However, when the non-professional group is broken down into sub-
groups, there are some signifi cant differences. For example, with re-
spect to big box rezoning, those identifi ed as retired, sales/clerical, or 
homemakers were much less likely (45%) than the professional and ser-
vice group (57%) to recommend the rezoning. The average respondent 
(Chart 1) in the labor, service, homemaker, and sales groups was about 
neutral on the big box rezoning issue, while the average professional 
leaned towards granting the application (.47). The average agricultural 
respondent leaned heavily against the rezoning. These results seem to 
indicate that professional respondents value economic development, 
while the other groups place more value on neighborhood concerns. 
 Moreover, if the big box rezoning were granted, the sales/clerical and 
agricultural groups were more likely to impose the screening (Chart 2) 
and stream preservation (Chart 3) requirements than the professional 
group. Conversely, the labor group was less concerned about screening 
for the neighbors or stream preservation than any other group. Interest-
ingly, our hypothesis was that blue-collar workers, especially those in 
the labor group, would be more likely to require screening to protect the 
modest neighborhood adjacent to the big box store. That is apparently 
not the case. 
 108. In some cases the category groupings do not match for the two tables because it 
was necessary to combine subgroups to achieve statistical signifi cance. 
 109. See Chart 5  infra. 
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 With respect to the gated community, three of the non-professional 
groups (labor, homemaker, and service) were more likely to demand 
access than the professional group, while the sales/clerical and agricul-
tural groups were less likely, as shown in Chart 4. This does seem to 
indicate that those groups typically excluded from gated communities, 
where they exist as mostly professional enclaves, are less likely to allow 
this exclusion. Finally, the professional group was signifi cantly more 
interested in tax breaks for historic preservation (88%) than the labor or 
service group (78%). 
 Farmers presented the most salient differences with the other oc-
cupational categories. For example, farmers were far more protective 
than the other groups of the agricultural land involved in the rezoning 
question. Only 25% of the agricultural group would grant the rezon-
ing, compared to 56% of the professionals and 58% of the service 
group. The average response of the agricultural group to the rezoning 
question was fi rmly negative (.67), while the professional group was 
about as strong (.47) in the opposite direction. Moreover, were the 
Chart 1: Big Box Rezoning Average Response by Occupation
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Chart 2: Screen—Average Response by Occupation
rezoning to be granted, 93% of the agricultural group would demand 
screening and 92% would require the stream to be left intact, indicat-
ing a strong preference for control of commercial development and 
respect for nature. The agricultural group was also the most interested 
in requiring sustainable development and historic preservation. It may 
be that farmers, who have long had to use conservation techniques 
and deal with government regulation of their farming methods, are 
more likely to require sauce for the gander as well. Finally, the farmers 
were least interested in gated community access, perhaps placing more 
value on the right to exclude. Ironically, while the results indicate that 
the agricultural group has the most distinct set of opinions, and may 
present the strongest voice against urban sprawl, they are almost en-
tirely excluded from the municipal planning and zoning process. 
 We attempted to identify those respondents whose occupations could 
be classifi ed as “development-related,” to determine whether their re-
sponses differed from the remainder of the group. Only 21 respondents 
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Chart 3: Stream—Average Response by Occupation
were clearly in this category, including occupations such as real estate 
agents, builders, landscapers, and architects. Contrary to our expec-
tations, this group did not favor the developer. In fact, the develop-
ment group was among the least likely to approve the big box rezoning. 
Moreover, this group was very favorably inclined toward the screening 
and stream requirements, sustainable development, historic preserva-
tion, and even gated community access. Certainly, the small sample 
size and the possibility of sample bias 110 cautions against reading too 
much into these results. On the other hand, the results indicate that even 
with a board made up entirely of individuals with development-related 
occupations, opinions on zoning issues may be remarkably diverse. 111 
 110. We collected a signifi cant portion of the survey responses at a Des Moines park, 
so respondents may have been more favorably inclined toward environmental/recrea-
tional interests than the general public. 
 111. For example, on the issue of whether to grant the big box rezoning, the four vot-
ing “defi nitely yes” included a real estate agent, mobile home salesperson, construction 
worker, and a roofer, while those voting “defi nitely no” included a builder, three people 
involved in construction, and one in commercial real estate sales. 
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Chart 4: Gated Access Percentage Preference by Occupation
Chart 5: Comparison of PTM and Development-
Related Responses
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 2. AGE 
 Differences in responses based on age categories do not, for the most 
part, rise to the level of statistical signifi cance. In response to the initial 
question of whether to recommend the rezoning, while a slightly greater 
percentage of the young (56%) and old (54%) groups would allow the 
store than the middle-aged group (52%), these differences are not statis-
tically signifi cant. The average responses indicate that the oldest group 
(65 and over) is more concerned about the neighbors (screening) than 
the natural environment (stream), while the other groups from 25-64 
feel more strongly about the stream than the neighbors. The oldest citi-
zens also cared the least about gated community access, probably plac-
ing security concerns over public trail access. 
 The middle-aged group tended to be a bit harder on the developers 
than either the youngest or oldest group. For example, when combin-
ing the responses of ages 35-54, 85% would require the big box store’s 
stream to be left in its original condition. Of those younger than 35, 
only 76% would require it, almost identical to the percentage in the old-
est group, those over 55. In addition, the middle-aged group is slightly 
more likely (83%) to favor historic preservation controls than the com-
bined oldest and youngest groups (76%). These are statistically sig-
nifi cant variations, which may indicate that middle-aged citizens either 
place slightly more emphasis on environmental/historical concerns or 
have slightly less concern for developers. 112 The average response re-
sults indicate that the very oldest citizens are much less likely to impose 
historic preservation controls, which seems slightly counter-intuitive. 
 3. EDUCATION 
 Some interesting variations can be found among those of different edu-
cation levels. Generally speaking, the highest-educated group was least 
likely to allow the big box rezoning and most likely to favor sustain-
able development requirements and historic preservation controls. Only 
49% of those with advanced degrees would vote in favor of the rezon-
ing, while 55% of those with less education would do so; this difference 
is not statistically signifi cant. It is statistically signifi cant that 93% of 
the highest-educated group would favor historic preservation with tax 
 112. The middle-aged group roughly correlates with the baby boomer generation, 
which would have been 41-61 years old at the time of this survey. Baby boomers may 
expect more from government than those in other generations.  See AARP,  A Chang-
ing Political Landscape As One Generation Replaces Another 12 (2004),  available at 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/boomer_politics.pdf. 
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incentives, while only 76% of the least-educated group would do so. 
The average response table shows a progressively stronger interest in 
historic preservation as education increases. Similarly, 91% of the most 
highly educated group would require sustainable development, while 
only 84.5% of those with less education would do so. The average re-
sponses confi rm that the more highly educated group was the most in-
terested in these low-impact measures. The average responses to the 
recreational exaction question present a nice progression, with higher 
education correlating with more interest in requiring developers to pro-
vide trails and parks. 
 Higher education also correlated, albeit weakly, with more protection 
for the gated community. Eighty-one percent of those with no college 
education would require public access while only 72.6% of those with 
at least some college would do so. This is consistent with studies in-
dicating that gated communities are typically populated by those with 
higher educational attainment. 113 However, the average response to this 
question shows that those without high school diplomas feel about the 
same as those with advanced degrees on the question of access. The 
middle of the educational range, therefore—those with some college 
or with a bachelor’s degree—are the ones least likely to require gated 
community access. 
 4. INCOME 
 Respondents at the lower end of the income scale were slightly more 
likely (57%) to allow the big box store than those at the top end (51%), 
but the difference was not statistically signifi cant. The lower income 
group, however, was more likely to require screening to protect the 
moderate income housing adjacent to the store. Remarkably, 93% of 
the lowest income group would require screening, and 88% of all those 
with incomes under $50,000 would do so. At the high income end, how-
ever, only 79% of those earning over $75,000 would require screening. 
Because the problem specifi ed that the houses adjacent to the develop-
ment were small, this could indicate that lower-income citizens would 
be more sensitive to impacts on modest neighborhoods. However, the 
average response table indicates that the very wealthiest segment also 
strongly supports the screening requirement. 114 
 113. Vessilinov,  supra note 92, at 116, fi g. 3. Almost half of gated owners hold a 
college or graduate degree, compared with a third of non-gated owners.  Id. 
 114. Perhaps the cost of the screen ($75,000) does not seem as signifi cant to this 
group. 
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 Lower income citizens were also slightly more likely to demand that 
developers donate bike trails and provide access to gated communities. 
About 88% of those earning below $75,000 would require the recre-
ational easements, while only 82% of those earning more than $75,000 
would. Similarly, 69% of those in the lower income categories would be 
likely to require gated community access, while only 61% of the upper 
income categories would. 115 This is confi rmed by the average response 
chart, which indicates that the top three levels of income category are 
much less interested in requiring gated community access than those in 
the lower income groups. 
 Conversely, the highest income group was signifi cantly more likely to 
favor historic preservation restrictions (86% to 77%). That group also had 
the highest average response score on the historic preservation questions. 
 5. TENURE 
 Homeowners were slightly more likely to allow the big box rezon-
ing than renters, but also would be more likely to require screens and 
stream preservation. The differences on these questions, however, were 
Chart 6: Percent Preference by Annual Income
 115. These are percentages of all respondents, including those who were “uncertain.” 
If “uncertain” responses are eliminated, there is still a marked difference between the 
groups (77% for those under $75,000/year compared to 72% for those over $75,000), 
but it does not quite reach the level of statistical signifi cance. 
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not  statistically signifi cant. In fact, the average responses show that 
even though more homeowners leaned toward requiring screens, rent-
ers actually felt more strongly about requiring screens. There was virtu-
ally no difference between the groups’ opinions regarding recreational 
easements. 
 As one might expect, a greater percentage of renters (78%) than home-
owners (73%) wanted to require gated community access. While the 
difference was less than the statistical signifi cance level, the average re-
sponse table confi rms this tendency, with renters scoring .2 above the 
home owners on this question. Similarly, more homeowners favored his-
toric preservation requirements, but again, just below signifi cance. Finally, 
homeowners were more likely to require sustainable development (88%) 
than non-homeowners (80%), and the average score confi rms this. 
 6. RACE 
 Generalizations about attitudes based on race are diffi cult due to the 
small number of non-white respondents. Of the 801 survey respon-
dents, almost 84% were Caucasian, while only sixty-eight African-
Americans (9%), forty-fi ve Hispanic/Latinos (6%), seventeen Asians 
(2%), and seven Native Americans (1%) were represented. Even these 
small numbers, however, indicate some signifi cant attitude differences 
between racial groups. 
 Of all of the racial groups, African-Americans, Asians and Native 
Americans were least likely to grant the big box rezoning, while Hispan-
ics were the most likely to recommend rezoning. The average response 
of the former three groups was in the negative range, while the average 
Hispanic response was .31. Caucasians were right in the middle of 
these groups. African-Americans were most likely to require screening 
to protect neighbors, while Asians were least likely. None of these dif-
ferences, however, reached the level of statistical signifi cance, due to 
the small sample sizes. The average response table indicates that Cau-
casians and African-Americans were almost equally likely to require 
stream preservation, screening, and recreational exactions. 
 The only statistically signifi cant difference among racial groups was on 
the question of gated community access. Fairly low percentages of Na-
tive Americans (57%), African-Americans (66%) and Hispanics (69%) 
would require access, while 100% of the small group of Asians surveyed 
would require access. Caucasians fell in the middle of these groups 
(76%). The average response table confi rms that Native Americans (.29) 
and African-Americans (.46) were the least likely to require access while 
Caucasians (.71) and Asians (1.35) would be much more likely to. 
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 Interestingly, gated communities are seen by many as white en-
claves, tending to exacerbate social segregation. 116 Yet, the survey in-
dicates that the racial groups historically shut out of these communities 
seem the least likely to demand access. While African-Americans have 
the lowest percentage of their population living in gated communities, 
the survey found that they were much less likely to require access than 
either whites or Asians, who have much higher percentages of gated 
community participants. At least some Asian countries have a tradi-
tion of public access to private land and it is possible that this tradi-
tional view of communal property could be refl ected in some of those 
responses. 117 Moreover, because one of the major motivations for mov-
ing to gated communities is fear of crime, 118 it is possible that urban 
dwellers more readily relate to the desire for increased security. 
 116.  See  supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. 
 117.  See Jerry L. Anderson,  Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights: The 
Right to Exclude , 56  J. Legal Educ . 539, 544 (2006) (discussing communal hunting 
rights among Hmong in Laos). 
 118.  See Low,  supra note 94, at 55 (interviewing gated community members showed 
fear to be a major motivation). 
Chart 7: Zoning Preferences by Race
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 E. Conclusions 
 Perhaps the most signifi cant results of this survey can be found in the 
overall responses to these zoning questions. The survey revealed that a 
large majority of the general public supports neighborhood protection 
and the public interest embodied in the environmental protection, his-
toric preservation, and gated access proposals, despite the potential im-
pact on economic development. Thus the survey seems to confi rm that 
the “average citizen” may be more concerned with community impact 
than economic growth. 
 In addition, the survey confi rmed our hypothesis that demographic 
variables could signifi cantly affect these opinions, although not always 
in ways we would have predicted. Among the signifi cant differences: 
 •  Older citizens appear to care more about security and neighbor-
hood protection than about recreation, historic preservation, or the 
environment. 
 •  Those most likely to require screening to protect the moderate in-
come neighborhood were those with lower incomes and less edu-
cation. In addition to protecting moderate income housing, lower 
income citizens were more likely to demand public amenities and 
gated community access. 
 •  Those most likely to require gated community access included 
Asian-Americans, renters, and those with lower incomes, while 
African-Americans, Hispanics, and those with higher education 
were least likely to require access. 
 •  White-collar professionals were more likely to grant big box re-
zoning than any of the other groups. Those with labor occupations 
were less likely to require screening or stream preservation than any 
of the other employed groups. Laborers were also less interested in 
sustainable development and recreational exactions. Conversely, 
those with clerical/sales occupations were less likely to grant big 
box rezoning and were more protective of the neighborhood. 
 •  Higher education correlated with stronger support for historic pres-
ervation, sustainable development requirements, and recreational 
exactions. 
 •  Those with development-related occupations did not exhibit bias 
toward the developer; however, the sample size was too small to 
confi rm this result. 
 In conclusion, it is diffi cult to generalize about exactly how zoning 
decisions might change if a broader array of occupations were repre-
sented on zoning boards. However, it is clear that various demographic 
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characteristics correlate with differing attitudes toward zoning issues. 
The results do suggest that selecting a more representational group of 
citizens would ensure that a broader range of opinions on land use mat-
ters are brought to the table. 
 V. Conclusion 
 Individuals with white-collar occupations dominate zoning boards 
across the country. Moreover, certain types of professional occupa-
tions—business, real estate, law, bankers, planners, and architects—
are disproportionately represented. In some cities, the majority of 
board members have some direct or indirect interest in the develop-
ment process. The question, however, is whether this is necessarily a 
bad thing. 
 The perfect composition of a zoning board may depend on whether 
one views its assigned role in the process as “professional” or “politi-
cal.” Early in the history of comprehensive zoning, our relative inexpe-
rience with the concept of city planning may have required boards to be 
populated with “experts”: architects who could analyze the impact of 
regulations on aesthetics, contractors who could assess the feasibility of 
design requirements and planners to provide the necessary urban design 
knowledge. 119 Moreover, the boards may have needed civic and busi-
ness leaders to ensure the legitimacy and public acceptance of relatively 
novel government controls. 120 Boards populated by “experts” might 
have been trusted more than ordinary citizens to be fair and impartial. 
Now, however, the maturity of the planning process and the availability 
of expert planning staff may allow lay boards to draw on a broader con-
stituency to fulfi ll a different role. 
 However, the ideal of a disinterested board member, “dedicated 
to the interest of the community as a whole” 121 may be impossible to 
achieve. Observers have long recognized that the zoning process can-
not be insulated from the political nature of land use decisions. In this 
view, there are no neutral participants; everyone has some stake in the 
 119.  Frederick H. Bair, Jr., The Zoning Board Manual 110 (1984) (stating that 
historically, experts were needed on boards, but the role is now changing). 
 120.  See  Herbert J. Gans, People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and 
Solutions 59-63 (1968) (describing historic dominance of business and civic leaders 
on planning boards); A lan Altshuler, The City Planning Process 388-89 (1966) 
(stating that the value of the planning board depends on the stature of its members be-
cause of the need to cultivate support for plans). 
 121.  Bair ,  supra note 119, at 110 (describing the ideal board member). 
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 process.  Instead, the answer may lie in ensuring that the competing in-
terest groups are adequately represented. 122 
 If there is a conclusion to be drawn, it is that the citizen’s board is, like just about 
everybody else with a role in the zoning process, probably going to suffer with—but 
nevertheless survive—a continuing st[r]eam of criticism from various forces and 
sources that question the legitimacy of its role. The temptations to join again the cho-
rus of those deploring that situation must be tempered by the reality that such bodies, 
despite continuing professional criticism, survive and prosper and, when threatened, 
are jealously defended by most of the nonprofessional participants in the zoning 
process. One suspects there must be some reason. 
 The reason may fi nd its roots in the continuing unease experienced by most people 
when they tried to decide whether zoning should be a political process or a pro-
fessional process. If lay boards are neither fi sh, fl esh, nor fowl, it is perhaps not 
surprising to fi nd them so deeply engrained in a process that is subject to the same 
schizophrenia. 123 
 Nevertheless, the results of the two studies in this article, taken to-
gether, illustrate that the current state of zoning board composition has 
signifi cant consequences. For example, the prevalence of board mem-
bers who place a higher value on economic growth than neighborhood 
and environmental impacts helps explain our inability to control urban 
sprawl and meaningfully control development. It may explain why 
gated communities are welcomed in most communities, despite their 
damaging public impacts. It may explain why high-impact land uses 
are located most often in poorer sections of town. The exclusion of the 
“average citizen” from zoning boards does make a difference, it seems, 
in ways that profoundly affect how our cities develop, which in turn af-
fect the daily lives of the people. 
 Approaching the 100 th anniversary of New York City’s comprehen-
sive zoning ordinance, it may be time to reconsider the precise role 
we want and need appointed citizen zoning boards to play in the plan-
ning and zoning process. Robert Walker suggested that there is a natu-
ral progression to the integration of new municipal activities: initially, 
the government may use an independent board to perform these func-
tions, but as they eventually become accepted government duties they 
 122.  Clifford L. Weaver & Richard F. Babcock, City Zoning: The Once and 
Future Frontier 276 (1979) (stating that the most effective way to achieve public 
interest is “to assure that all the segments of the public having an interest in land use 
decisions have an opportunity to infl uence those decisions”);  Kmiec ,  supra note 3, at 
§ 4:4 (stating that boards have diversifi ed because professional expertise is often ac-
companied by self-interest). 
 123. Weaver & Babcock, supra note 122, at 164-65. 
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should be administered by the municipal government itself. 124 A careful 
re-examination of planning and zoning board activities may result in 
the reassignment of board duties to different bodies. The function of 
developing a comprehensive plan, for example, may call for a large 
group drawn from a broad cross-section of the community, supported 
by expert consultants, while the detailed review of site plans is a tech-
nical process that might be better left in the hands of administrative 
employees. Inherently political choices, such as zoning amendments, 
should be decided by elected offi cials. Short of major reform, however, 
courts should recognize that zoning boards do not typically represent 
the average citizen. They may want to reconsider whether deference 
continues to be appropriate, when the decision-making body is neither 
neutral nor elected and cannot be properly said to comprise the “proper 
representatives” of the community. 
 124. W alker,  supra note 8, at 134 (calling this the “Theory of Functional Accre-
tion”); s ee also id . at 370. 
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 Appendix 1 
 Survey No. _________ 
 DRAKE LAW SCHOOL ZONING SURVEY 
 Assume you are a member of the planning and zoning commission for 
your city. This commission is responsible for approving plans for any 
new land developments in the city. The commission also makes recom-
mendations for zoning changes to the city council. 
 QUESTIONS 1-3: Major Stores, Inc., has submitted a plan to the plan-
ning and zoning commission for a large building supply store (like 
Menard’s or Home Depot) on a piece of land that is now used for ag-
ricultural purposes. The proposal will require a zoning change from 
agricultural to commercial. The site is adjacent to a residential area, 
built in the 1970’s, made up of small, but tidy, houses on relatively 
small lots. Your commission has heard from many neighbors worried 
about the additional traffi c, noise, and loss of privacy this development 
would cause. The commission has also heard from city offi cials who are 
in favor of the plan, because it will bring additional jobs and economic 
development to the city. 
 Please answer the following questions about this proposal: 
 1.  Would you vote to recommend the zoning change to commercial, 
in order to allow this development? 
 DEFINITELY YES  PROBABLY YES  UNSURE  PROBABLY NO  DEFINITELY NO 
 2.  The developer must also obtain the commission’s approval of its 
specifi c plan for developing the site. A neighbor proposes that, as a 
condition of plan approval, the developer be required to plant trees and 
bushes or install a privacy fence around the perimeter of the site, to 
lessen the impact on the neighboring houses. The developer protests 
that the cost of the screening would be at least $75,000 and argues that 
the new development will not greatly affect neighboring property val-
ues. Would you vote in favor of this screening requirement? 
 DEFINITELY YES  PROBABLY YES  UNSURE  PROBABLY NO  DEFINITELY NO 
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 3.  Assume that there is a meandering stream on the site of the pro-
posed building supply store. The stream is lined with trees and provides 
habitat for wildlife, while also providing some fl ood and erosion con-
trol. The proposed site plan calls for the vegetation, including trees, to 
be cleared, the stream straightened and turned into a canal, lined with 
concrete. It is possible that the stream could be left in its original condi-
tion, but this would result in a 20% smaller buildable area, which the 
developer claims would make the whole project unworkable. Would 
you vote in favor of requiring, as a condition of plan approval, that the 
stream be left in its original condition? 
 DEFINITELY YES   PROBABLY YES  UNSURE  PROBABLY NO  DEFINITELY NO 
 4.  Would you favor a requirement that every developer who puts in 
a new residential housing development be required to dedicate a cer-
tain portion of their development as a biking/hiking trail, park, or other 
public use? 
 DEFINITELY YES   PROBABLY YES  UNSURE  PROBABLY NO  DEFINITELY NO 
 5.  Assume that a developer plans a new “gated community” of ex-
pensive houses, called Lakeside, on the edge of a town called Riverton. 
The gated community will have 100 new homes on large lots and will 
be located on 200 acres including a private lake and golf course. On the 
other side of the development is a public walking/bike trail along a river. 
Because the gated community plans to bar entrance to everyone except 
residents and their guests, the general public will not be allowed to walk 
or drive through the community to reach the bike trail on the other side. 
Instead, Riverton residents will have to travel around the gated com-
munity on public roads, which will lengthen their path to the trail by an 
average of one mile. 
 Would you be in favor of requiring Lakeside to allow public access to 
their streets and sidewalks? 
 DEFINITELY YES   PROBABLY YES  UNSURE  PROBABLY NO  DEFINITELY NO 
 6.  Some communities are beginning to require developers to use 
more sustainable practices. For example, commercial developments 
may have use special pavement on their parking lots, which allows 
storm water to seep through rather than run off. Residential develop-
ments may use grassy culverts rather than curbs and gutters to catch 
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storm water. Would you be in favor of requiring these types of sustain-
able practices, even if they increase the cost of development by 10%? 
 DEFINITELY YES   PROBABLY YES  UNSURE  PROBABLY NO  DEFINITELY NO 
 7.  Assume that a certain district in your town has many buildings, 
both commercial and residential, built in the 1920s in a particularly 
attractive architectural style. A developer has bought up several of the 
properties and plans to take the buildings down to make room for a 
modern offi ce building. The developer would make several million dol-
lars on this development, whereas the area now has very little income 
potential. Would you be in favor of declaring this area a historic preser-
vation zone, which would prevent the owner from destroying or making 
signifi cant changes to these buildings? 
 DEFINITELY YES   PROBABLY YES  UNSURE  PROBABLY NO  DEFINITELY NO 
 8.  Would you be in favor of the historic building restrictions if the 
owners were compensated by property tax reductions or other incen-
tives for some of the costs of maintaining and renovating these historic 
structures? 
 DEFINITELY YES   PROBABLY YES  UNSURE  PROBABLY NO  DEFINITELY NO 
 Please provide the following information: 
 OCCUPATION: ____________________________________________ 
 RETIRED __________________ (if retired, please indicate primary 
job before retirement and check here) 
 OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY: 
  Labor 
  Service 
  Agricultural 
  Professional, Managerial, Technical 
  Housewife/husband 
  Unemployed 
  Retired (check box above for last occupation) 
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 HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
  Middle school/Jr. High 
  Some high school 
  High School graduate 
  Some college/ assoc. degree 
  Bachelor’s degree 
  Masters/PhD/adv. degree 
 
 APPROX. ANNUAL GROSS FAMILY INCOME RANGE 
  UNDER $25,000 
  $25,000-49,999 
  $50,000-74,999 
  $75,000-99,999 
  $100,000-149,000 
  over $150,000 
 RACE/ ORIGIN (if mixed, check all that apply): 
  Caucasian/White 
  African-American/Black 
  Hispanic/Latino 
  Asian 
  American Indian/Alaska Native 
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 AGE: 
  18-24 
  25-34 
  35-44 
  45-54 
  55-64 
  65-74 
  over 75 
 Do you own or rent your dwelling? 
  Own 
  Rent 
  Other/live with family, friends 
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